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chapter 7
Commercial Mining Activities in the Deep Seabed 
beyond National Jurisdiction: the International 
Legal Framework
Joanna Dingwall
1 Introduction
The deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction covers approximately half of 
our planet, yet it is the most inaccessible and least explored area on earth.1 It is 
home to a wealth of mineral resources, including a variety of valuable metals 
and rare earth elements.2 Deep seabed minerals await discovery on volcanic 
ridges, rocky outposts and amongst the sediment of the ocean floor, typically 
at depths of up to around 5,000 metres.3
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS or the 
Convention) established the regime which governs mining in the deep seabed 
beyond national jurisdiction (referred to in this Chapter as the ‘deep seabed’ 
or the ‘Area’).4 The Convention defines the Area as comprising ‘the seabed and 
ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.’5 At 
present, as many coastal States have still to determine the outer boundaries of 
1   The author’s analysis of the status of the deep seabed mining regime, and the extent of min-
ing activities within it, is current as at 1 November 2018. All web links cited in this Chapter 
are correct as at that date. The views expressed herein are those of the author alone and 
do not necessarily represent the views of the Scottish Government or the University of 
Glasgow. Elements of this Chapter are also addressed by this author in Joanna Dingwall, ‘The 
International Legal Regime Applicable to the Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed’ (2018) 
9 Eur YB of Intl Economic L 261–287.
2   International Seabed Authority ‘Marine Mineral Resources’ (2003) <www.isa.org.jm/files/
documents/EN/Brochures/ENG6.pdf>; Jim Hein ‘ISA Briefing Paper 02/12 – Prospects for 
Rare Earth Elements from Marine Minerals’ (May 2012) <www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/
EN/Pubs/BP2.pdf>.
3   ISA, ‘Marine Mineral Resources’ (n2).
4   United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted and opened for signature 
10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3, Part XI and Annex III.
5   UNCLOS, art 1(1).
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their continental shelves, the precise boundaries of the Area remain ‘fluid.’6 
However, to put the size of the Area into perspective, it constitutes approxi-
mately 260 million square kilometres, which is around 72% of the total surface 
area of the oceans.7
UNCLOS created the International Seabed Authority (ISA or the Authority), 
which is the autonomous international organisation charged with overseeing 
and administering a system for deep seabed mining.8 The ISA is responsible 
for regulating the Area and granting contracts (also referred to as licences) 
to explore for and exploit deep seabed mineral resources.9 The regime incor-
porates various key elements, including benefit-sharing aspects and marine 
environmental protections.10 Moreover, the ISA is empowered to develop a 
comprehensive Mining Code, intended to augment the regime and govern the 
entire lifecycle of deep seabed mining operations.11
In relation to deep seabed mining in the Area, the Convention defines 
‘resources’ as ‘all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in situ in the Area 
at or beneath the sea-bed, including polymetallic nodules.’12 Once extracted 
from the Area, such resources are referred to as ‘minerals.’13 The Area and its 
resources constitute ‘the common heritage of mankind.’14 As the UNCLOS 
6    Michael W Lodge, ISA Secretary-General, ‘Statement to the Open Meeting of the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf ’ (United Nations, New York, 
10 March 2017) 4 <www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/SG-Stats/2017/CLCS-10Mar17.
pdf>. For analysis of the boundary between national jurisdiction and the Area, see 
Chapter 4 of this book, H. Brekke ‘Setting maritime limits and boundaries: Experiences 
from Norway.’ See also, e.g., Erik Franckx, ‘The 200 Mile Limit: Between Creeping 
Jurisdiction and Creeping Common Heritage?’ (2007) 39 George Washington Intl Rev 
467; Erik Franckx, ‘The International Seabed Authority and the Common Heritage of 
Mankind: The Need for States to Establish the Outer Limits of their Continental Shelf ’ 
(2010) 25 Intl J Marine and Coastal L 543.
7    Michael W Lodge, ‘Satya Nandan’s Legacy for the Common Heritage of Mankind’ 
in Michael W Lodge and Myron H Nordquist (eds), Peaceful Order in the World’s Oceans 
(Brill 2014) 290, fn22. See also BW Eakins and GF Sharman, ‘Volumes of the World’s 
Oceans from ETOPO1’ (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 
National Geophysical Data Center 2010) <www.ngdc.noaa.gov/mgg/global/etopo1_
ocean_volumes.html> (the surface area of the oceans is 361.9 million square kilometres).
8    UNCLOS, art 156.
9    UNCLOS, arts 153, 157(1) and see also Annex III.
10   See, e.g., UNCLOS, arts 140, 145, 148.
11   For further consideration of the ISA’s Mining Code, see Chapter 25 of this book, 
K. Svendsen, ‘Liability and Compensation for Activities in the Area’.
12   UNCLOS, art 133(a).
13   UNCLOS, art 133(b).
14   UNCLOS, art 136.
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deep seabed mining regime is not applicable to living resources, controversy 
remains as to whether marine genetic resources constitute part of the com-
mon heritage.15
The focus of this Chapter is to provide an introduction to the Convention’s 
deep seabed mining regime and the extent of commercial activities currently 
occurring within it. In order to conduct this analysis, Section 2 of this Chapter 
provides a brief snapshot of the regime’s historical development. Section 3 then 
evaluates the current scope of the UNCLOS deep seabed mining regime and 
the manner in which commercial actors may participate within it. Thereafter, 
Section 4 provides a flavour of the status of commercial mining activities in the 
Area so far. Finally, Section 5 provides concluding remarks on the deep seabed 
mining regime.
2 The Development of the UNCLOS Deep Seabed Mining Regime
The mineral resources of the deep seabed have considerable economic poten-
tial. As early as the 1800s, the HMS Challenger expedition had already discovered 
the existence of polymetallic nodules on the deep ocean floor.16 However, the 
economic prospects of deep seabed resources only began to catch the inter-
national community’s imagination half a century ago. During the 1960s, the 
prospective riches of the deep seabed began to seem within humanity’s grasp.17 
As technology advanced, for the first time the untold wealth of the seabed 
appeared tantalisingly close.18
15   For analysis of this issue, see: Chapter 10 of this book, T. Scovazzi, ‘The Rights to Genetic 
Resources beyond National Jurisdiction: Challenges for the ongoing Negotiations at 
the United Nations’; Chapter 11 of this book, M.W. Tvedt, ‘Marine genetic resources: A 
Practical Legal Approach to Stimulate Research, Conservation and Benefit Sharing’. See 
also, e.g., Konrad Jan Marciniak, ‘Marine Genetic Resources: Do They Form Part of the 
Common Heritage of Mankind Principle?’ in Lawrence Martin and others (eds), Natural 
Resources and the Law of the Sea: Exploration, Allocation, Exploitation of Natural Resources 
in Areas under National Jurisdiction and Beyond (Juris Publishing 2017).
16   See Chapter 3 of this book, Håkon With Andersen, ‘A Short Human History of the Ocean 
Floor’. See also John Murray and Alphonse François Renard, ‘Report on Deep-Sea Deposits 
Based on the Specimens Collected During the Voyage of HMS Challenger in the Years 1872 
to 1876’ (Neill & Co for HM Stationary Office 1891).
17   See, e.g., John L Mero, The Mineral Resources of the Sea (Elsevier 1965).
18   See, e.g., UNGA First Committee (22nd Session) ‘Speech by Arvid Pardo’ (1 November 1967, 
3 pm) UN Doc A/C.1/PV.1516, para 9.
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Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, against the backdrop of decolonisation, 
entitlement to deep seabed resources became an ideological battleground, 
split into broadly two camps.19 In one camp were the industrialised States, 
favouring freedom for all States to exploit deep seabed resources on a first-
come, first-served basis. In the other camp were the developing States, fighting 
for a contrary system whereby deep seabed resources could be exploited only 
for the benefit of humanity.20 The latter camp were motivated by the realisa-
tion that without careful regulation, to allow freedom for all to exploit deep 
seabed resources would not be as egalitarian as it appeared.21 A free-for-all 
system would in fact preserve deep seabed mining as the domain of the small 
number of wealthy States possessing the relevant technical expertise, who 
would be in prime position to carve up the spoils between them.22
In a remarkable feat, after decades of wrangling, the developing States 
achieved their vision in many key respects. The UNCLOS deep seabed regime, 
which was finally agreed in 1982, is a unique scheme for common resource 
management. It is underpinned by the principle that the deep seabed consti-
tutes ‘the common heritage of mankind’ and cannot be alienated unilaterally.23 
This application of the common heritage concept to the deep seabed was a 
notion first formally introduced before the UN General Assembly by Malta’s 
Ambassador, Arvid Pardo on 1 November 1967.24 In terms of the content of the 
common heritage concept, as commentary explains:
19   For further elaboration on the regime’s historical development, see, e.g., Martti 
Koskenniemi and Marja Lehto, ‘The Privilege of Universality: International Law, Economic 
Ideology and Seabed Resources’ (1996) 65 Nordic J Intl Law 533, 536–552; RR Churchill and 
AV Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd edn, Manchester UP 1999) 224–229; ED Brown, Sea-Bed 
Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime, vol 2 (Martin Nijhoff Publishers 
2001), Ch 2; Erkki Holmila, ‘Common Heritage of Mankind in the Law of the Sea’ (2005) 
1 Acta Societatis Martensis 187; John E Noyes, ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind: Past, 
Present, and Future’ (2012) 40 Denver J Intl L & Policy 447, 459–460; Helmut Tuerk, ‘The 
International Seabed Area’ in Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Norman A Martinez Gutierrez 
(eds), The IMLI Manual on International Maritime Law, vol I (OUP 2014) 280–282.
20   See, e.g., UNGA Res 2574D (XXIV) (15 December 1969), which called for a moratorium on 
deep seabed mining in the Area, pending establishment of an international legal regime.
21   Rosalyn Higgins, Problems & Process – International Law and How We Use It (Clarendon 
Press 1994) 130–131.
22   Higgins (n21) 130–131; and Koskenniemi/Lehto 540; Churchill/Lowe 225; Noyes (2012) 459–
460 (all n19).
23   UNCLOS, arts 136 and 137, respectively.
24   UNGA First Committee (22nd Session) ‘Speech by Arvid Pardo’ (1 November 1967, 10.30 
am) UN Doc A/C.1/PV.1515. See also UNGA Res 2749 (XXV) (17 December 1970) (the 
Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil 
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The common heritage concept implied that [the deep seabed] was 
open to use by the international community, but was not owned by it. It 
required a system of management in which all users had a right to par-
ticipate as well as an active sharing of benefits and reservation for future 
generations, and thus also had environmental implications.25
As this Chapter addresses further below, all of these elements are captured 
within the UNCLOS deep seabed mining regime.
Part XI of UNCLOS contains the legal regime applicable to deep seabed 
mining, and this is elaborated in Annex III, which details the licensing appli-
cation process and conditions. However, industrialised States viewed Part XI 
as having swung too far in favour of developing States.26 The regime’s particu-
larly contentious features included requirements for mandatory transfer of 
technology,27 and the expansive role envisaged for the ISA’s intended mining 
arm, the Enterprise, together with the subsidisation of the Enterprise by States 
Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction) (which captured Pardo’s com-
mon heritage vision for deep seabed mining). For discussion of precursors to Pardo’s 
speech by nineteenth century jurists, see Myron H Nordquist and others (eds), United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, vol VI (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2002) 6–7; Michael W Lodge, ‘International Seabed Authority’s Regulations on 
Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area’ (2002) 20 J Energy and 
Natural Resources L 270, 271, fn5; Kemal Baslar, The Concept of the Common Heritage of 
Mankind in International Law (Martin Nijhoff Publishers 1998) 80–81.
25   Tuerk (n19) 280. See also LFE Goldie, ‘A Note on Some Diverse Meanings of “The Common 
Heritage of Mankind”’ (1983) 10 Syracuse J Intl L and Commerce 69; Michael W Lodge, ‘The 
Common Heritage of Mankind’ (2012) 27 Intl J Marine and Coastal L 733. On the concept 
of the common heritage more broadly, including in relation to the seabed, the moon 
and Antarctica see, e.g., see Rüdiger Wolfrum, ‘The Principle of the Common Heritage of 
Mankind’ (1983) 43 Heidelberg J Intl L 312; Christopher C Joyner, ‘Legal Implications of the 
Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind’ (1986) 35 ICLQ 190; Barbara Ellen Heim, 
‘Exploring the Last Frontiers for Mineral Resources: A Comparison of International 
Law Regarding the Deep Seabed, Outer Space, and Antarctica’ (1990–91) 23 Vanderbilt J 
Transnational L 819; Baslar (n24); Graham Nicholson, ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind 
and Mining: An Analysis of the Law as to the High Seas, Outer Space, the Antarctic and 
World Heritage’ (2002) 6 New Zealand J Intl L 177; Jennifer Frakes, ‘The Common Heritage 
of Mankind Principle and the Deep Seabed, Outer Space, and Antarctica: Will Developed 
and Developing Nations Reach a Compromise?’ (2003) 21 Wisconsin Intl L J 409; Edward 
Guntrip, ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind: An Adequate Regime for Managing the 
Deep Seabed?’ (2003) 4 Melbourne J Intl L 376; Rüdiger Wolfrum, ‘Common Heritage of 
Mankind’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
(OUP 2009); Noyes (2012) (n19) 447.
26   Churchill/Lowe 231; Tuerk 282 (both n19).
27   As originally detailed in UNCLOS, Annex III, art 5.
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Parties.28 Therefore, for over a decade, there was a stalemate. Many industri-
alised States, including the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), 
Germany, France, Italy, Japan and Russia, refused to ratify UNCLOS, thereby 
impeding the Convention’s entry into force.29
Eventually, in 1994, the international community reached a compromise. 
This took the form of the Agreement on the Implementation of Part XI of 
UNCLOS (1994 Agreement).30 Whilst retaining the tenor of the deep seabed 
regime as envisaged originally by UNCLOS, the 1994 Agreement made signifi-
cant modifications to its operation, eliminating some of its more controversial 
aspects.31 For example, the 1994 Agreement removed from the regime both 
the subsidisation of the Enterprise and the mandatory transfer of technology 
requirements.32 In light of the 1994 Agreement’s modification of the deep sea-
bed mining regime, the Convention entered into force on 16 November 1994.
Presently, the UNCLOS deep seabed mining regime (as modified by the 
1994 Agreement) enjoys broad support throughout the international com-
munity. The overwhelming majority of States are parties to UNCLOS (with 
perhaps the most notable exception being the US). Currently, UNCLOS has 168 
28   As mandated previously by art 170(4) of UNCLOS, read in conjunction with arts 171 and 
173(2)(b).
29   In numerical terms there were sufficient developing States to bring the Convention into 
force (only sixty State ratifications were necessary to achieve this, as per UNCLOS, art 
308). However, in practice, the Convention system could not operate successfully without 
political and financial support from industrialised States. See Koskenniemi/Lehto (n19) 
534–535, 542–544; Churchill/Lowe (n19) 230–231; Lodge (2002) (n24) 272.
30   Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (adopted 28 July 1994, entered into force pro-
visionally 16 November 1994 and definitively 28 July 1996) 1836 UNTS 3.
31   On the fundamental changes which the 1994 Agreement introduced, see, e.g., DH Anderson, 
‘Further Efforts to Ensure Universal Participation in the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea’ (1994) 43 ICLQ 886; Bernard H Oxman, ‘The 1994 Agreement and the 
Convention’ (1994) 88 AJIL 687; Louis B Sohn, ‘International Law Implications of the 1994 
Agreement’ (1994) 88 AJIL 696; ED Brown, ‘The 1994 Agreement on the Implementation of 
Part XI of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: Breakthrough to Universality?’ (1995) 
19 Marine Policy 5; LDM Nelson, ‘The New Deep Sea-Bed Mining Regime’ (1995) 10 Intl J 
Marine and Coastal L 189; Koskenniemi/Lehto (n19) 535, 549–551; RP Anand, ‘Common 
Heritage of Mankind: Mutilation of an Idea’ (1997) 37 Indian J Intl L 1; Churchill/Lowe 
(n19) 238, 248–251; Nordquist (n24) 4, 67; Lodge (2002) (n24) 272.
32   See 1994 Agreement, Annex ss2(3) and 5, respectively. In addition, the role of the 
Enterprise was curtailed significantly; 1994 Agreement, Annex s2. For discussion on all 
these points, see Nordquist (n24) 4.
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States Parties, including the European Union (EU).33 In addition, the ISA also 
has some 30 States participating in its activities as observers (including the 
US), together with various observer international organisations and NGOs.34 
Moreover, many aspects of UNCLOS are recognised as having the status of cus-
tomary law, binding on all States irrespective of whether or not they are parties 
to the Convention.35 Against this backdrop, Section 3 of this Chapter will now 
address key aspects of the Convention’s deep seabed mining regime.
3 The UNCLOS Deep Seabed Mining Regime
The UNCLOS deep seabed mining regime is contained within Part XI of the 
Convention and elaborated upon in Annex III, as modified by the 1994 
Agreement. The provisions of Part XI of UNCLOS and the 1994 Agreement are 
to be interpreted and applied together as a single instrument; but, in the event 
of inconsistency between them, the provisions of the latter prevail.36 In addi-
tion, the ISA is augmenting the regime through adoption of rules to regulate 
deep seabed mining.
The following analysis addresses the key features of the regime (3.1), the 
means by which commercial operators can participate within the licensing 
process (3.2) and the position of actors outside of the regime (3.3).
3.1 Key Elements of the UNCLOS Deep Seabed Mining Regime
The premise of the UNCLOS deep seabed mining regime is that the deep seabed 
and its resources are the ‘common heritage of mankind’37 and mining activities 
33   The 1994 Agreement has 150 States Parties (all of which are also parties to UNCLOS itself). 
See United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, ‘Chronological 
List of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the Related 
Agreements’ (3 April 2018) <www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_
of_ratifications.htm>.
34   UNCLOS, art 156(3); see also ISA, ‘Observers’ <www.isa.org.jm/observers> for the current 
list of ISA observers. See James Harrison, Making the Law of the Sea (CUP 2011) 128 on the 
role of these observers.
35   Churchill/Lowe (n19) 24; Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin, ‘UNCLOS III and the Process 
of International Law-Making’ in Tafsir Malick Ndiaye and Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds), Law of 
the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2007) 
376, 380; Harrison (n34) 52–56; John E Noyes, ‘The Law of the Sea Convention and the 
United States of America’ (2014) 47 Revue Belge de Droit Intl 15, 32.
36   1994 Agreement, art 2(1).
37   UNCLOS, art 136.
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must be carried out ‘for the benefit of mankind as a whole.’38 Accordingly, 
the deep seabed mining system must take the interests of developing States 
into account and promote their effective participation.39 Moreover, the ISA is 
charged with developing mechanisms to guarantee equitable sharing of finan-
cial and other economic benefits derived from the Area.40 Another key element 
of the regime is the protection of the marine environment.41 Fundamentally, 
pursuant to the regime, States and other actors are prohibited from conduct-
ing unilateral deep seabed mining activities. No State or entity can unilaterally 
claim sovereignty over the deep seabed or its resources.42 Rather, all explora-
tion and exploitation activities in the Area are subject to the permission and 
oversight of the ISA.43
As an international organisation, the ISA has international legal per-
sonality, entitling it to the full range of international rights and duties of an 
international person.44 The two principal organs which establish the ISA’s 
policies and govern its work are the Assembly, in which all States Parties are 
represented; and the 36-member Council elected by the Assembly, which func-
tions as the ISA’s executive organ.45 The Secretariat is the ISA’s third principal 
organ and it conducts the ISA’s administration.46 The ISA is also assisted by 
its Legal and Technical Commission (LTC), which is an organ of the Council,47 
38   UNCLOS, art 140(1).
39   UNCLOS, arts 148, 152(2).
40   UNCLOS, arts 140(2), 160(2)(f)(i), 160(2)(g) and 162(o)(i).
41   See, e.g., UNCLOS, art 145. For analysis of issues concerning environmental protec-
tion in deep seabed mining, see, e.g., Kristina M Gjerde, ‘Challenges to Protecting the 
Marine Environment beyond National Jurisdiction’ (2012) 27 Intl J Marine and Coastal 
L 839; Rüdiger Wolfrum, ‘The Contribution of the Regulations of the International 
Seabed Authority to the Progressive Development of International Environmental Law’ 
in Michael W Lodge and Myron H Nordquist (eds), Peaceful Order in the World’s Oceans 
(Brill 2014); Tullio Scovazzi, ‘The Exploitation of Resources of the Deep Seabed and 
the Protection of the Environment’ (2014) 57 German YB Intl L 181; Aline L Jaeckel, The 
International Seabed Authority and the Precautionary Principle – Balancing Deep Seabed 
Mineral Mining and Marine Environmental Protection (Brill 2017) 121–131.
42   UNCLOS, art 137.
43   UNCLOS, art 137(2); see also arts 153 and 157(1) and 1994 Agreement, Annex, s1(1).
44   UNCLOS, art 176. See also Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations 
Case (Advisory Opinion) [1949] ICJ Rep 174, 179; Markos Karavias, Corporate Obligations 
Under International Law (OUP 2013) 121.
45   UNCLOS, arts 158(1), 159–162.
46   UNCLOS, arts 158(1), 166.
47   UNCLOS, arts 163(1)(b), 165. The Convention provided also for the Council to be supported 
by an Economic Planning Commission, but that body is not operational; see UNCLOS, arts 
163(1)(a), 164; cf. 1994 Agreement, Annex, s1(4).
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and the Finance Committee, a subsidiary organ of the Assembly, composed of 
representatives of the Council.48 The Authority’s mining arm, the Enterprise, 
is not yet operational.49
The ISA is a unique and unusual body with far-reaching institutional pow-
ers of a kind which are arguably unparalleled within the international legal 
system.50 It plays the crucial role of custodian of the deep seabed, a role which 
is enshrined in both UNCLOS and the 1994 Agreement.51 The ISA’s mandate is 
expressed most clearly in Article 157(1) of UNCLOS, which provides that ‘[t]he 
Authority is the Organization through which States Parties shall, in accordance 
with [Part XI], organize and control activities in the Area, particularly with a 
view to administering the resources of the Area.’ The ISA is entrusted with the 
role of organising, implementing and controlling activities in the Area ‘on 
behalf of mankind as a whole.’52 To that end, the ISA has the power to adopt 
rules and regulations to govern deep seabed mining activities, with the aim of 
developing a comprehensive Mining Code to regulate exploration and exploi-
tation for all forms of resources in the Area.53
The Mining Code adds another layer to the Convention’s byzantine deep 
seabed mining regime and constitutes secondary law by the ISA.54 The ISA is 
still in the process of creating a bespoke Mining Code to govern the entire life-
span of deep seabed mining operations. Thus far, the ISA has implemented 
three sets of regulations, which concern prospecting and exploration activi-
ties for three types of minerals (namely, polymetallic nodules, polymetallic 
48   1994 Agreement, Annex, s9; see also s3(4), (7).
49   UNCLOS, art 170; 1994 Agreement, Annex, s2.
50   See, e.g., Rüdiger Wolfrum, ‘Legitimacy of International Law and the Exercise of 
Administrative Functions: The Example of the International Seabed Authority, the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) and International Fisheries Organizations’ 
in Armin von Bogdandy and others (eds), The Exercise of Public Authority by International 
Institutions – Advancing International Institutional Law (Springer 2010) 917 (citing the ISA 
is a ‘rare’ example of an international entity ‘exercising functions equivalent to those of 
States’ on the basis that it exercises executive and legislative functions and has jurisdic-
tion to enforce its rules directly via a binding dispute resolution system. As such, the ISA is 
‘without question, a prime example of what may be referred to as an international admin-
istration’ (at 934)). See also Jaeckel (n41) 146–148.
51   UNCLOS, art 137(2); see also arts 153 and 157(1) and 1994 Agreement, Annex, s1(1).
52   UNCLOS, art 153(1); see also art 137(2).
53   UNCLOS, arts 140(2), 145, 160(2)(f), 162(o), 165(2)(f), and Annex III, art 17; 1994 Agreement, 
Annex, s1(1), (5)(f)–(g), (15). For analysis of the ISA’s broad powers to progressively develop 
the deep seabed mining regime, see Harrison (n34) 122–123, 152.
54   Karavias (n44) 121–122.
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sulphides and cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts),55 together with environ-
mental recommendations.56 Moreover, the ISA is working at present to develop 
regulations for the exploitation of all resource types within the Area, through 
an extensive stakeholder process.57
3.2 Participating within the UNCLOS Licensing Regime for Deep Seabed 
Mining
Under the terms of the ISA’s licensing regime, only certain actors are enti-
tled to apply to conduct deep seabed mining operations in the Area.58 The 
Convention provides that such activities in the Area may be carried out by 
States Parties to the Convention or by ‘state entities or natural or juridical per-
sons which possess the nationality of States Parties or are effectively controlled 
by them or their nationals, when sponsored by such States.’59 The ISA’s explo-
ration regulations echo this requirement of nationality or control.60 Therefore, 
non-State actors, such as private corporations, seeking to participate within 
the UNCLOS regime must obtain sponsorship from all States of which they are 
nationals, and ‘[i]f another State or its nationals exercises effective control, the 
sponsorship of that State is also necessary.’61 Only upon receiving appropriate 
55   ISA, Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area 
(adopted 13 July 2000) ISBA/6/A/18, (updated 25 July 2013) ISBA/19/C/17 (Nodules 
Regulations); ISA, Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Sulphides 
in the Area (adopted 7 May 2010) ISBA/16/A/12/Rev.1 (Sulphides Regulations); ISA, 
Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Cobalt-Rich Ferromanganese Crusts in 
the Area (adopted 27 July 2012) ISBA/18/A/11 (Cobalt Regulations).
56   See, e.g., ISA LTC, ‘Recommendations for the Guidance of Contractors for the Assessment 
of the Possible Environmental Impacts arising from Exploration for Marine Minerals in 
the Area’ (1 March 2013) ISBA/19/LTC/8.
57   For an overview of this process, see ISA, ‘Ongoing Development of Regulations on 
Exploitation of Mineral Resources in the Area’ <www.isa.org.jm/legal-instruments/
ongoing-development-regulations-exploitation-mineral-resources-area>. The ISA’s cur-
rent draft exploitation regulations are ISA LTC, ‘Draft Regulations on Exploitation of 
Mineral Resources in the Area’ (9 July 2018) ISBA/24/LTC/WP.1/Rev.1.
58   For more detailed analysis by this author of the operation of the UNCLOS deep seabed 
mining regime, see Dingwall (n1).
59   UNCLOS, art 153(2)(b).
60   Nodules Regulations, reg 9(b); Sulphides Regulations, reg 9(b); Cobalt Regulations, 
reg 9(b).
61   Responsibility and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to 
Activities in the Area (Advisory Opinion of 1 February 2011) ITLOS Reports 2011, 10 (ITLOS 
Advisory Opinion) para 77. This is confirmed also in Regulation 11(1)–(2) of the Nodules, 
Sulphides and Cobalt Regulations. Regulation 11(1) specifies that ‘[i]f the applicant has 
more than one nationality (…) each State involved shall issue a certificate of sponsorship.’ 
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sponsorship from a States Party will a non-State actor be entitled to submit an 
application to the ISA to conduct exploration or exploitation activities.62
Indeed, as the Seabed Disputes Chamber (Chamber) of the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) has emphasised, the ‘notion of “spon-
sorship” is a key element in the system for the exploration and exploitation of 
the resources in the Area.’63 One purpose behind the sponsorship requirement 
is ‘to achieve the result that the obligations set out in the Convention, a treaty 
under international law which binds only States Parties thereto, are complied 
with by entities that are subjects of domestic legal systems.’64 Moreover, by 
entering into a contract with the ISA, a non-State contractor becomes directly 
bound to adhere to various international legal obligations concerning deep 
seabed mining.65
To similar effect, Regulation 11(2) requires that ‘[w]here the applicant has the national-
ity of one State but is effectively controlled by another State or its nationals, each State 
involved shall issue a certificate of sponsorship.’
62   The sponsorship scheme does not, however, apply to applications by States Parties, who, 
by virtue of their sovereign status, are not required to demonstrate sponsorship. See 
UNCLOS, Annex III, art 4(5): this interpretation is confirmed by ITLOS Advisory Opinion 
(n61) para 79.
63   ITLOS Advisory Opinion (n61) para 74.
64   ITLOS Advisory Opinion (n61) para 75; as the Chamber acknowledged, this end is also 
achieved by virtue of the ISA’s regulations, which apply to all contractors. Notably, States 
Parties are responsible for ensuring that any activities that they (or State-sponsored 
entities) conduct in the Area are carried out in conformity with the Convention regime; 
UNCLOS, art 139. Any States Party failing to discharge this responsibility will be held 
responsible at international law. However, as per UNCLOS, art 139(2), a States Party does 
not incur liability for wrongful activities of its sponsored entity if that States Party has 
taken ‘all necessary and appropriate measures to secure effective compliance’ by the 
sponsored entity; see also arts 153(4) and 138. See further ITLOS Advisory Opinion (n61) 
para 122 (considering the extent of sponsoring State liability for State-sponsored entities 
and endorsing a high standard of due diligence, encompassing a legal obligation upon 
States to apply the precautionary approach and best environmental practices); see also 
David Freestone, ‘Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and 
Entities With Respect To Activities in the Area’ (2011) 105 AJIL 755.
65   Karavias (n44) 124 (‘[t]he Standard Clauses [to the ISA contract], in turn, transpose the 
content of the [UNCLOS] provisions regarding activities in the Area and of the [ISA] 
Regulations into the contractual arrangement, thus providing a nexus between [UNCLOS] 
and the secondary law enacted by the ISA and the contract for exploration.’).
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States or State-sponsored entities seeking to explore for and exploit deep 
seabed resources must submit a plan of work for the ISA’s approval. Once 
approved by the ISA and signed, the plan of work takes the form of a contract 
between the ISA and the contractor.66
The UNCLOS regime was intended to function as a parallel system: States 
and State-sponsored entities would be permitted to conduct deep seabed min-
ing activities in tandem with the ISA’s mining arm, the Enterprise.67 To that 
end, it institutes a site-banking system, whereby a contractor’s plan of work 
must specify a total area for exploration or exploitation which is ‘sufficiently 
large and of sufficient estimated commercial value to allow two mining opera-
tions’ and ‘indicate the coordinates dividing the area into two parts of equal 
estimated commercial value.’68 On that basis, the ISA designates one part of 
the submitted area as a ‘reserved area.’69 Before the 1994 Agreement’s modifi-
cations, the UNCLOS regime envisaged that mining activities in reserved areas 
would be conducted ‘solely’ by ‘the Authority through the Enterprise or in asso-
ciation with developing States.’70 However, the 1994 Agreement suspended the 
role of the Enterprise for the time being.71
Under the present regime, the State or entity which contributes a particular 
area to the ISA as a reserved area now has the right of first refusal to enter into 
a joint venture agreement with the Enterprise for exploration and exploita-
tion of that reserved area.72 In the event that that right of first refusal is not 
exercised, it is open for developing States and entities sponsored by them, 
including private actors, to apply to explore and exploit the reserved area.73 
In relation to sulphides and cobalt crusts exploration, the ISA modified the 
66   UNCLOS, art 153(3) and Annex III, art 3(5); see also 1994 Agreement, Annex, s1(6)(a)(i).
67   UNCLOS, art 153(2).
68   UNCLOS, Annex III, art 8.
69   See UNCLOS, Annex III, art 8 and 1994 Agreement, Annex, s1(10).
70   UNCLOS, Annex III, art 8; see further art 9. See also UNCLOS, Annex IV.
71   1994 Agreement, Annex, s2. In the interim period, the ISA Secretariat performs the 
Enterprise’s functions. The Secretariat is presently conducting a study into the Enterprise’s 
operationalisation; the terms of reference for this study are contained in ISA Secretariat, 
‘Note on Issues Relating to the Operation of the Enterprise, in Particular, the Legal, 
Technical and Financial Implications for the Authority and for State Parties’ (12 June 2014) 
ISBA/20/LTC/12, Annex. The Secretary-General anticipates that the Council will con-
sider a full proposal for operationalisation of the Enterprise during 2019; IISD Reporting 
Services, ‘Summary of the Twenty-Fourth Annual Session of the International Seabed 
Authority (Second Part): 16–26 July 2018’ (29 July 2018) 25:168 Earth Negotiations Bulletin 
10 <http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb25168e.pdf>.
72   1994 Agreement, Annex, s2(5).
73   UNCLOS, Annex III, art 9(4).
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site-banking system further, permitting an applicant seeking permission to 
explore for sulphides or cobalt crusts to offer an equity interest in a joint ven-
ture arrangement to the Enterprise instead of submitting a reserved area.74 At 
present, the LTC is considering whether to amend the Nodules Regulations to 
align them with the approach to sulphides and cobalt crusts in this regard.75
Once exploitation commences, the ISA will oversee redistribution of finan-
cial and other economic benefits derived from the resources of the Area. These 
benefits are to be shared equitably, on a non-discriminatory basis, through a 
mechanism which the ISA has still to devise.76 Currently, deep seabed min-
ers contemplating exploitation activities face continued levels of uncertainty, 
given that levels of fees and royalties and precise terms of exploitation con-
tracts are still to be determined. However, despite this, the ISA’s stakeholder 
consultation process provides a unique opportunity to harness input from 
a wide range of actors, including commercial operators and environmental 
experts.77 This process could facilitate achievement of an exploitation regime 
which allows commercially viable mining activities while ensuring appropri-
ate safeguards for the environment and the common heritage principles at the 
heart of the regime.
Indeed, as Section 4 of this Chapter will demonstrate, notwithstanding the 
developing nature of the existing regime, participation in the Area is increas-
ing. Various States, State actors and private entities are positioning themselves 
to take advantage of the perceived opportunities afforded by deep seabed 
resources. However, what is the position of actors which are positioned outside 
of the UNCLOS regime, such as States which are not parties to the Convention, 
or their nationals? This following Section will address this point.
3.3 The Position of Actors outside of the UNCLOS Deep 
Seabed Mining Regime
The result of the Convention’s system for participation is that non-States 
Parties to UNCLOS (NSPs) are not eligible to participate within the regime. 
Equally, non-State actors which have the sole nationality of a NSP cannot 
74   Sulphides Regulations, regs 16, 19; Cobalt Regulations, regs 16, 19.
75   ISA LTC, ‘Report of the Chair of the Legal and Technical Commission on the Work of the 
Commission at the First Part of its Twenty-Fourth Session’ (26 April 2018) ISBA/24/C/9 
para 18; see also ISA Secretariat, ‘Issues Related to the Possible Alignment of the Authority’s 
Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration Concerning the Offer of an Equity Interest in 
a Joint Venture Arrangement’ (6 February 2018) ISBA/24/LTC/4.
76   UNCLOS, art 140(2).
77   On this process, see text to n57 above and accompanying citations.
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obtain sponsorship and apply to the ISA to explore for or exploit deep seabed 
resources. Indeed, there is a strong argument that the UNCLOS deep seabed min - 
ing regime now constitutes ‘the only game in town’ and any competing regime 
would ‘surely be condemned as inconsistent with international law.’78
Arguably, elements of the Convention’s deep seabed mining regime, such as 
its prohibition on unilateral mining activities in Article 137, may have attained 
the status of customary law.79 For example, Koskenniemi and Lehto catego-
rise the UNCLOS deep seabed regime as ‘having become part of the normative 
reality’ and maintain that ‘[u]nilateral mining outside the Convention will be 
illegal.’80 Various factors support this conclusion. The UNCLOS deep seabed 
mining regime is adhered to or recognised by the international community as 
a whole.81 This near-universal acceptance of the regime, coupled with the lack 
of contrary deep seabed mining practice outside of the regime (including by 
key NSPs),82 renders it difficult to refute the claim that a State or other actor 
undertaking unilateral deep seabed mining activities would violate custom-
ary law.83 Egede reaches this conclusion upon an assessment of State practice, 
concluding that the UNCLOS regime is ‘binding on all states (both states par-
ties and non-states parties) and consequently no state, not even non-parties, 
may unilaterally embark on mining activities in the Area.’84
78   Noyes (2012) (n19) 465.
79   Custom is ‘evidence of a general practice accepted as law’; Statute for the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) (opened for signature 26 June 1945 as annex to UN Charter, entered 
into force 24 October 1945) UKTS 67 (1946), art 38(1)(b). See also ILC, ‘Identification of 
Customary International Law – Text of the Draft Conclusions as Adopted by the Drafting 
Committee on Second Reading’ (17 May 2018) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.908*, Draft Conclusion 2.
80   Koskenniemi/Lehto (n19) 551–552. Similarly see Jonathan I Charney, ‘The United States 
and the Law of the Sea After UNCLOS III – The Impact of General International Law’ 
(1983) 46(2) L and Contemporary Problems 37, 49; Holmila (n19) 202–205; Edwin Egede, 
Africa and the Deep Seabed Regime: Politics and International Law of the Common Heritage 
of Mankind (Springer 2011) 66–69; Noyes (2012) (n19) 465; Lodge (2014) (n7) 282–298.
81   As noted at text to n34 above, almost all NSPs to UNCLOS participate within the ISA as 
observer States. See also Lodge (2012) (n25) 737–738.
82   Cf. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases [1969] ICJ Rep 3, paras 72–74 (where the ICJ recog-
nised that treaty provisions may generate new customary law provided that they have 
a ‘fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be regarded as the basis for a 
general rule of law’ (para 72). Moreover, in order for treaty provisions to create new cus-
tomary rules, ‘even without the passage of any considerable period of time, a very wide-
spread and representative participation in the convention might suffice of itself, provided 
it included that of States whose interests were specially affected’ (para 73)).
83   See, e.g., Nelson (n31) 202; Koskenniemi/Lehto (n19) 551–552; Holmila (n19) 205; Egede 
(n80) 66–69; Noyes (2012) (n19) 465; Lodge (2014) (n7) 282–298.
84   Egede (n80) 69.
Joanna Dingwall - 9789004391567
Downloaded from Brill.com08/06/2020 03:20:35PM
via free access
153Commercial Mining Activities in the Deep Seabed
Certainly, the only definitive way in which NSPs can render their nationals 
eligible to undertake mining activities in the Area is through the ratification 
of UNCLOS. For example, as the US is not a party to UNCLOS, neither the US 
nor any US nationals are entitled to participate in the ISA’s licensing system. 
Only by ratification of UNCLOS would the US be eligible to apply to the ISA 
for mining rights or to sponsor US entities who wish to obtain ISA approval 
to mine. Thus, only by acceding to UNCLOS could the US secure for itself and 
its nationals legally recognised, internationally enforceable deep seabed min-
ing rights backed by investment protections and binding international dispute 
resolution options.85
Any entity conducting mining operations in the Area without ISA 
authorisation – and absent the rights of exclusivity and security of tenure that 
an ISA contract affords86 – would expose itself to tremendous risk. Given the 
significant investment required to mount deep seabed mining operations, it 
does not seem credible that an actor would engage in mining activities without 
a clear legal basis and enforceable legal title.87
This is borne out in practice: NSPs or their nationals are not in fact conduct-
ing mining activities in the Area outside of the UNCLOS regime.88 For example, 
the US maintains a domestic regime for exploration and exploitation of min-
eral resources in the Area: the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (US 
Act), which it enacted in 1980.89 At present, only two deep seabed exploration 
licences remain active under the US Act, and both of these are held by US 
85   For detailed analysis by this author of the investment protections and dispute resolu-
tion options for deep seabed miners within the UNCLOS regime, see Joanna Dingwall, 
‘International Investment Protection in Deep Seabed Mining Beyond National 
Jurisdiction’ (2018) 19 J World Investment & Trade 890.
86   UNCLOS, art 153(6) and Annex III, arts 3(4)(c), 16; these rights are reflected in Standard 
Clauses 2.1 and 2.2 of ISA exploration contracts contained within the fourth annex to the 
Nodules Regulations, Sulphides Regulations and Cobalt Regulations. See also Charney 
(n80) 50–51; Karavias (n44) 124–125.
87   John Noyes, ‘Ocean Resources and US Acceptance of the LOS Convention’ (Opinio Juris, 
14 June 2012) <http://opiniojuris.org/2012/06/14/ocean-resources-and-u-s-acceptance-of 
-the-los-convention/>. This sentiment holds equally true for the exploitation phase, once 
it begins: Brown (2001) (n19) 3 (‘the very considerable investment needed to finance such 
exploitation would become available only if a legal regime could be created under which 
potential exploiters could acquire secure legal titles’).
88   Lodge (2014) (n7) 282–298.
89   Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act 30 USC §§ 1401–1473 (2002) (USA); see also 
NOAA, Deep Seabed Mining Regulations for Exploration Licenses 15 Code of Federal 
Regulations § 970.100 2016.
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defence giant, Lockheed Martin.90 However, as the US has recognised, in order 
for Lockheed Martin’s US licence claims to be afforded ‘international recogni-
tion’ and security of tenure, the US would need to accede to UNCLOS.91 Indeed, 
the US Department of State opined that if Lockheed Martin proceeded with 
exploration activities absent such international recognition, this would violate 
its licence terms.92
In September 2017, the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion (NOAA) addressed the interaction of these US licences with the UNCLOS 
deep seabed mining regime. Firstly, NOAA acknowledged that the US Act’s 
‘express purpose’ is to establish an interim deep seabed mining regime, pend-
ing US ratification of UNCLOS.93 As such, as NOAA explained, a licence under 
the US Act ‘gives the holder the exclusive right to explore a specific area, but 
only as against other US entities.’94 On this basis, ‘[a]ny rights a US company 
may have domestically are not secured internationally because US companies 
are not able to go through the internationally recognized process at the [ISA] 
established for Parties to [UNCLOS].’95
In fact, instead of proceeding outside of the UNCLOS system, NSP nationals 
are structuring their investments in a way that permits participation within 
UNCLOS. For example, operating within the framework of UNCLOS, the UK 
has sponsored two applications to the ISA by a British corporation seeking to 
explore for polymetallic nodules. Both applications were made by UK Seabed 
Resources Ltd (UKSRL), which was incorporated in May 2012 and is a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin.96
90   US Department of Commerce, NOAA, ‘Deep Seabed Mining – Report to Congress’ 
(December 1995) i <www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/gcil_dsm_1995_report.pdf>.
91   US Department of Commerce, NOAA, ‘Extension of Deep Seabed Exploration Licenses: 
Response to Comments’ (30 December 2015) Vol 80, Issue 250 FR 81529, 81530.
92   80 FR 81529 (n91) 81530. To similar effect see also US Department of Commerce, NOAA, 
‘Deep Seabed Mining: Request for Extension of Exploration Licenses’ (29 February 2012) 
Vol 77, Issue 40 FR 12245, 12246; US Department of Commerce, NOAA, ‘Coastal Programs 
Division’ (10 July 2012) Vol 77, Issue 132 FR 40586.
93   US Department of Commerce, NOAA, ‘Deep Seabed Mining: Approval of Exploration 
License Extensions’ (7 September 2017) Vol 82, Issue 172 FR 42327, 42328.
94   82 FR 42327 (n93) 42328.
95   82 FR 42327 (n93) 42328.
96   UKSRL is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin UK Holdings Ltd, which is the 
UK-based component of Lockheed Martin Corporation. The Lockheed Martin conglom-
erate is headquartered in Maryland, US.
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Provided the test of effective control is met,97 the deep seabed regime con-
tains no proscriptions to prevent a subsidiary constituted in the territory of 
a States Party and sponsored by that States Party from applying to engage in 
activities in the Area in this manner. Indeed, ITLOS has confirmed implicitly the 
freedom of commercial actors to set up companies in foreign States and acquire 
the nationality and sponsorship of those States.98 Although the Chamber cau-
tioned against ‘[t]he spread of sponsoring States “of convenience”’, this was 
in the context of determining whether developing and developed States were 
subject to the same responsibilities and liabilities when acting as sponsoring 
States.99 Therefore, by pursuing deep seabed mining activities through a UK 
subsidiary, US national Lockheed Martin managed to circumvent successfully 
the legal restrictions upon its participation.
In light of the above, deep seabed mining activity outside of the UNCLOS 
regime appears unlikely to occur at present due to the commercial, financial 
and legal risks and uncertainty that it would involve for any entity.
4 The Extent of Commercial Activities within the Area
4.1 Commercial Prospects for Deep Seabed Mining in the Area and 
Environmental Concerns
A host of actors are now participating in deep seabed mining activities in the 
Area. Currently, these activities are still at the exploration phase. Long-term 
commercial prospects for the deep seabed mining industry remain uncertain 
given the high costs and technological challenges involved in deep seabed 
mineral extraction, compounded by other factors such as fluctuating metal 
prices and environmental concerns.100
Notably, deep seabed mining faces major opposition on environmental 
grounds.101 On that basis, in January 2018, the European Parliament called 
97   See discussion at text to nn59–61 above.
98   ITLOS Advisory Opinion (n61) para 159.
99   ITLOS Advisory Opinion (n61) para 159 (the Chamber found that in order to prevent a 
race to the bottom, the regulatory burden must be equally applied to developing and 
developed States, otherwise corporations could choose to route their activities through 
the former to take advantage of lesser regulation).
100   Rahul Sharma, ‘Deep-Sea Mining: Economic, Technical, Technological, and Environmental 
Considerations for Sustainable Development’ (2011) Marine Technology Society J 45(5) 28, 
28–31.
101   See overview in Luz Danielle O Bolong, ‘Into the Abyss: Rationalizing Commercial Deep 
Seabed Mining through International Law’ (2016) 25 Tulane J Intl & Comparative L 127, 
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for a moratorium on deep seabed mining until its impacts on the marine envi-
ronment are more fully understood.102 Within civil society, a variety of NGOs 
oppose deep seabed mining, with the Deep Sea Mining Campaign supporting 
the ban of deep seabed mining activities in both international and national 
waters, and Greenpeace vehemently protesting future exploitation of deep 
seabed minerals.103 Deep seabed exploitation, in particular, presents certain 
common concerns irrespective of the type of mineral being exploited. These 
include direct destruction of habitats, together with marine degradation 
through plumes of seafloor sediments generated by mining activities and other 
resultant effects, such as underwater noise, vibration and light pollution.104
Environmental controversy notwithstanding, the exploitation phase of 
deep seabed mining may begin in the coming years.105 As the ISA’s Secretary 
General remarked in February 2018, ‘[a]t a time when some appear to want 
to enter into an existential debate about whether deep sea mining should be 
permitted to go ahead or not, we do well to remember that the international 
community passed that point already many years ago.’106 Indeed, Michael 
Lodge, the current Secretary-General of the ISA, previously described the scale 
141–146. For a scientific assessment of environmental concerns posed by deep seabed 
mining, see, e.g., Rahul Sharma, ‘Environmental Issues of Deep-Sea Mining’ (2015) 11 
Procedia Earth & Planetary Science 204. For detailed legal consideration of the balance 
between mineral exploitation and marine environmental protection, see, e.g., Jaeckel 
(n41); see also Gjerde (n41).
102   European Parliament, ‘International Ocean Governance: An Agenda for the Future 
of our Oceans in the Context of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals’ 
(16 January 2018) <www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P 
8-TA-2018-0004+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN>.
103   The Deep Sea Mining Campaign is an association of NGOs, including Oxfam Australia 
and Mining Watch Canada, together with other concerned individuals; Deep Sea Mining 
Campaign <www.deepseaminingoutofourdepth.org/>. See also Greenpeace International, 
‘Deep Sea Mining’ (Background, 20 March 2014) <www.greenpeace.org/international/
en/campaigns/oceans/marine-reserves/deep-sea-mining/>. Greenpeace, alongside over 
70 other NGOs, is part of the Deep Sea Conservation Coalition (an umbrella movement 
seeking to protect deep sea ecosystems): Deep Sea Conservation Coalition <www.savethe 
highseas.org/>.
104   Sharma (2015) (n101) 205; Jaeckel (n41) 11–14.
105   See, e.g., ISA Press Release, ‘Commercialization of Marine Minerals in Deep Seabed Well 
Within Reach, International Seabed Authority Secretary-General States as He Introduces 
Annual Report’ (19 July 2016) SB/22/11.
106   Michael Lodge, ISA Secretary-General, ‘Statement at the Workshop on the Draft 
Regulations for the Exploitation of Mineral Resources in the Area: Policy, Legal and 
Institutional Considerations’ (London, 12–13 February 2018) 1 <www.isa.org.jm/sites/
default/files/documents/EN/SG-Stats/sg-statement_0.pdf>.
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of deep seabed mineral deposits as ‘staggering.’107 Based on industry projec-
tions, by 2030, deep seabed mining could constitute 10% of all global mining 
activity and have a value of around $65 billion in 2010 prices.108 Notably, this 
level of activity would be only the tip of the iceberg in terms of the potential 
resources present on the ocean floor. For example, the value of gold deposits 
lurking on the deep seabed has been calculated at $150 trillion in 2013 prices.109
As noted above, thus far, licences for exploration relate to three particular 
types of minerals: polymetallic nodules, polymetallic sulphides and cobalt-
rich crusts.110 The first of these resource types, polymetallic nodules, are 
potato-sized rock deposits on the deep ocean floor, containing manganese, 
iron and other metals, such as copper and nickel. The second resource type, 
sulphides, generally contain iron, copper and zinc and may contain quantities 
of gold and silver. Most commonly, such sulphides emanate from hydrother-
mal vents on the mid-ocean ridge, where tectonic plates meet. Thirdly, cobalt 
crusts often form on rocky outcrops and ridges in the sea floor and contain ele-
ments such as manganese, iron, cobalt, nickel and lead. Each of these seabed 
deposits comprise relatively high concentrations of valuable metals as com-
pared to equivalent minerals extracted on land.111 As terrestrial metal stocks 
become depleted due to rising material consumption, experts anticipate that 
107   Michael Lodge, ‘Deep Sea Mining: The New Frontier in the Struggle for 
Resources?’ [2014] World Economic Forum <https://agenda.weforum.org/2014/11/
deep-sea-mining-the-new-frontier-in-the-struggle-for-resources/>.
108   European Commission, ‘Blue Growth – Opportunities From the Marine and Maritime 
Sustainable Growth’ COM (2012) 494 final, 10; Sheila Moorcroft, ‘Ocean Mining – a Race 
to the Bottom’ (Shaping Tomorrow, 17 April 2013) <www.shapingtomorrow.com/home/
alert/94162-Ocean-mining–a-race-to-the-bottom>.
109   Meghan Miner, ‘Will Deep-Sea Mining Yield an Underwater Gold Rush?’ National 
Geographic News (3 February 2013) <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/ 
13/130201-underwater-mining-gold-precious-metals -oceans-environment/ 
#.UysXr_ldXGA>.
110   For an overview of the geological characteristics of these resource types, see Chapter 1 of 
this book, Alvar Braathen and Harald Brekke, ‘Characterizing the Seabed – A Geoscience 
Perspective’. See generally Tim Schröder (ed), World Ocean Review: Marine Resources – 
Opportunities and Risks, vol 3 (Maribus 2014).
111   James R Hein and others, ‘Deep-Ocean Mineral Deposits as a Source of Critical 
Metals for High- and Green-Technology Applications: Comparison With Land-Based 
resources’ (2013) 51 Ore Geology Reviews 1; see also Suzanne Goldenberg, 
‘Marine Mining: Underwater Gold Rush Sparks Fears of Ocean Catastrophe’ The 
Observer (2 March 2014) <www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/mar/02/
underwater-gold-rush-marine-mining-fears-ocean-threat>.
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corresponding costs will continue to rise.112 In this context, experts predict 
that metals extracted from the deep seabed will be increasingly sought after.113
Moreover, seabed minerals may contain traces of rare earth elements 
(REEs).114 REEs are highly desirable commodities: critical for the manufactur-
ing of green energy technology, such as solar panels, wind turbines and hybrid 
cars, and in the weapons industry. They are also essential in the electronics 
industry for production of high-tech gadgets such as smart phones, laptops 
and flat-screen televisions. The volume of REEs available from the deep seabed 
could potentially exceed global land reserves of REEs.115 In this context, global 
excitement is growing over potential deep seabed mining for REEs in both 
national and international deep seabed areas.116 Deep seabed mining for REEs 
could be a viable means by which to secure a reliable supply chain, insulated 
from potential geopolitical ruptures.
As the following Section will address, in pursuit of deep seabed resources, 
commercial actors have already made significant investments, and there are 
indications that commercial mineral extraction could begin in the Area in the 
years to come.117
112   UN Environment Programme (UNEP), ‘Wealth in the Oceans: Deep Sea Mining on the 
Horizon?’ (Global Environmental Alert Service, May 2014) 1 <https://na.unep.net/geas/
archive/pdfs/GEAS_May2014_DeepSeaMining.pdf>; Yves Fouquet and Denis Lacroix, 
‘Study Summary’ in Yves Fouquet and Denis Lacroix (eds), Deep Marine Mineral Resources 
(Springer 2014) 5; European Commission, ‘Report on Critical Raw Materials for the EU: 
Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Defining Critical Raw Materials’ (May 2014) 9 
<http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/10010/attachments/1/translations/en/ren 
ditions/native>; Houses of Parliament, Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 
‘Deep-Sea Mining’ (POSTnote 508, September 2015) 1–2 <http://researchbriefings.files 
.parliament.uk/documents/POST-PN-0508/POST-PN-0508.pdf>.
113   European Commission (2012) (n108) 10; UNEP (n112) 1; Houses of Parliament (n112) 1–2.
114   Hein (n2) 1–2; Yves Fouquet and Bruno Martel-Jantin, ‘Rare and Strategic Metals’ in Yves 
Fouquet and Denis Lacroix (eds), Deep Marine Mineral Resources (Springer 2014) 63ff.
115   Yasuhiro Kato and others, ‘Deep-Sea Mud in the Pacific Ocean as a Potential Resource for 
Rare-Earth Elements’ (2011) 4 Nature Geoscience 535, 538.
116   Ian Coles, ‘Rare Earth Elements: Deep Sea Mining and the Law of the Sea’ (2014) 14 Pratt’s 
Energy L Rep 4, 8–10; Bolong (n101) 134–135.
117   See, e.g., ISA Press Release (n105); see also UNEP (n112); Houses of Parliament (n112). See 
further David Shukman, ‘Deep Sea Mining “Gold Rush” Moves Closer’ BBC News Online 
(18 May 2013) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-22546875>; Goldenberg 
(n111); Adam Minter, ‘Seafloor Gold Rush Could Have Alarming Impact’ Japan Times 
(21 August 2016) <www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/08/21/commentary/world-
commentary/seafloor-gold-rush-alarming-impact/#.W2sBQLllJaQ>; Julie Packard and 
Chris Scholin, ‘The Deep Sea May Soon Be Up for Grabs’ New York Times (8 June 2018) 
<www.nytimes.com/2018/06/08/opinion/the-deep-sea-may-soon-be-up-for-grabs.html>.
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4.2 Current Participants in Deep Seabed Mining Activities in the Area
As of the end of 2018, the ISA has entered into mining contracts with twenty-
nine contractors for exploration in relation to the three minerals types currently 
regulated (nodules, sulphides and cobalt-rich crusts).118 These figures include 
a significant increase in the number of contracts granted in recent years. As 
recently as early 2011, the ISA had approved only eight applications for explora-
tion; by late 2015, that figure had more than tripled.
The total area of deep seabed which the ISA has approved for exploration 
now surpasses 1.3 million square kilometres: an area approximately equivalent 
to the land mass of Sweden, Norway, Finland, Iceland and Denmark com-
bined.119 Although this approved area may seem vast, in fact it represents only 
half a percent of the entire deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction which is 
open to licencing by the ISA.
The ISA holds exploration contracts with a wide variety of actors, including 
States, State enterprises, State institutions, State-controlled corporations and 
several private corporations. At present, of the existing twenty-nine contracts, 
one is held by an international consortium of States (exploring for nodules), 
eight are held by States (exploring for nodules, sulphides or cobalt crusts), 
and fifteen are held by State enterprises, State institutions or State-controlled 
corporations (of which nine contracts are for nodules exploration and the 
remainder concern exploration for sulphides or cobalt crusts). In terms of State 
or State-controlled activity, the nations which have been most active so far in 
securing ISA licences are China, Russia, and South Korea. These three States 
are the only ones to hold exploration contracts relating to all of the three types 
of mineral which are currently regulated. At present, China has the greatest 
number of licences of any State or national. China’s fourth contract for deep 
seabed mineral exploration rights (and its second in respect of nodules) was 
signed in 2017 by the ISA and China’s State-owned metals and minerals trading 
company, China Minmetals Corporation.
The remaining five ISA contractors are private corporations exploring for 
polymetallic nodules (with two active in reserved areas). The first private 
118   Seventeen of the ISA’s mining contracts relate to nodules exploration, seven are 
for sulphides exploration, and five are for exploration of cobalt-rich crusts. For an 
overview, see ISA, ‘Deep Seabed Minerals Contractors’ <www.isa.org.jm/deep-seabed 
-minerals-contractors>.
119   This figure includes all areas approved for exploration, excluding any reserved areas 
which are not currently subject to exploration. For information on the exploration con-
tracts approved by the ISA to date, including details of size and location of exploration 
sites, see the ISA website: <www.isa.org.jm/>.
Joanna Dingwall - 9789004391567
Downloaded from Brill.com08/06/2020 03:20:35PM
via free access
160 Dingwall
actor to enter a contract with the ISA for nodules exploration was Tonga 
Mining Offshore Limited (TMOL) in 2012.120 The contract concerns portions 
of reserved areas originally contributed by French, German and Japanese State 
entities and South Korea. A Tongan national, TMOL is a wholly-owned subsid-
iary of Canadian mining company Nautilus Minerals Inc (Nautilus).
In 2013, Belgian corporation, G-Tec Sea Minerals Resources NV (GSR), and 
UK corporation, UKSRL, both entered contracts with the ISA.121 In March 2016, 
UKSRL entered a second contract with the ISA for nodules exploration.122 As 
noted above, UKSRL is a subsidiary of the US defence giant, Lockheed Martin. 
The remaining private contractor in the Area is Ocean Mineral Singapore Pte 
Ltd (OMS), a Singaporean corporation with an ISA contract to explore for nod-
ules in a reserved area originally contributed by UKSRL.123
In addition to acting directly as contractors, some private corporations also 
have links to activities in the Area by State-controlled actors. For example, the 
Cook Islands Investment Corporation (CIIC), a State enterprise, entered a con-
tract with the ISA in July 2016 for nodules exploration.124 CIIC entered into 
a joint venture agreement with GSR to jointly explore the area within CIIC’s 
ISA contract, under the proviso that future profits would be shared equally 
between CIIC and GSR.125
120   ISA Council, ‘Decision of the Council Relating to a Request for Approval of a Plan of Work 
for Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules Submitted by Tonga Offshore Mining Limited’ 
(19 July 2011) ISBA/17/C/15.
121   ISA Council, ‘Decision of the Council of the International Seabed Authority Relating 
to a Request for Approval of a Plan of Work for Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules 
Submitted by G-TEC Sea Mineral Resources NV’ (26 July 2012) ISBA/18/C/28; ISA Council, 
‘Decision of the Council of the International Seabed Authority Relating to a Request for 
Approval of a Plan of Work for Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules Submitted by UK 
Seabed Resources Ltd’ (26 July 2012) ISBA/18/C/27.
122   ISA Council, ‘Decision of the Council Relating to an Application for the Approval of a Plan 
of Work for Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules Submitted by UK Seabed Resources Ltd’ 
(21 July 2014) ISBA/20/C/25.
123   ISA Council, ‘Decision of the Council Relating to an Application for the Approval of a Plan 
of Work for Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules Submitted by Ocean Mineral Singapore 
Pte Ltd’ (21 July 2014) ISBA/20/C/27. OMS is majority owned by Keppel Corporation, 
a Singaporean corporation and one of the world’s largest offshore and marine groups. 
Minority shares in OMS are held by UKSRL and Lion City Capital Partners Pte Ltd, a 
Singaporean private investment company.
124   ISA Council, ‘Decision of the Council Relating to an Application for the Approval of a 
Plan of Work for Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules Submitted by the Cook Islands 
Investment Corporation’ (21 July 2014) ISBA/20/C/29.
125   SOPAC, ‘Cook Islands Enters New International Seabed Minerals Arrangement in 
Cooperation with GSR of Belgium’ (The Prospect, 3 January 2014); Michael Henry, 
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In practical terms, joining forces with private actors may provide developing 
States lacking in technical capabilities and resources, one of the only viable 
means by which to become active in deep seabed mining.126 For example, in its 
application, CIIC stated that its combined approach with GSR would ‘[enable 
them] to enhance all relevant synergies in scientific, ecological and economi-
cal research and studies to the absolute maximum.’127
To sum up, exploration activities in the Area are increasing, and this is espe-
cially so for private corporate contractors. Despite remaining uncertainties 
concerning long-term commercial prospects of deep seabed mining, increas-
ing investment in the industry gives a strong indication that it may soon 
proceed towards commercialisation.
5 Conclusion
In the coming years, commercial extraction of deep seabed minerals may 
become feasible. As this Chapter has explored, despite continued uncertain-
ties and challenges within the deep seabed mining industry, commercial 
investment in deep seabed mining is growing, and the volume of exploration 
activities in the Area continues to rise. An increasing number of States, State 
entities and private investors are now participating in deep seabed explora-
tion activities under the ISA’s licensing process within the UNCLOS regime. In 
this context, the ISA Secretary-General anticipates that deep seabed mining 
beyond national jurisdiction is ‘well within reach’ and ‘attainable in the fore-
seeable future.’128
Under international law, there is a detailed legal framework for deep seabed 
mining activities within the Convention and associated instruments, includ-
ing the 1994 Agreement and the ISA’s Mining Code. All deep seabed mining 
activities in the Area are occurring under the auspices of this UNCLOS regime. 
‘International Seabed Authority Contract Signing’ (Cook Islands Investment Corpo-
rations Online News, July 2016) <http://ciiconline.com/latestnews/international-seabed 
-authority-contract-signing/>. In an interesting dynamic, the area which CIIC intends to 
explore is a reserved area which was originally contributed by GSR pursuant to its 2013 
nodules exploration contract with the ISA.
126   Tuerk (n19) 301.
127   ISA LTC, ‘Application for Approval of a Plan of Work for Exploration for Polymetallic 
Nodules by the Cook Islands Investment Corporation’ (8 November 2013) ISBA/20/LTC/3 
para 13.
128   ISA Press Release (n105).
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In practice, one key test for the future success of the regime will be the precise 
shape of the ISA’s expanding regulatory code governing the exploitation phase, 
including its financial terms and environmental protections. Therefore, the 
ISA’s current efforts to draft workable exploitation regulations, which takes on 
board the views of stakeholders in the industry, is a crucial movement towards 
the long-term realisation of a viable deep seabed mining industry in the Area.
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